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I

n November 2013, President Barack Obama signed
the Drug Quality and Security Act, aimed at regulating compounding pharmacies and establishing a
track-and-trace pedigree system for drugs. The law
falls short of the mark on both
counts. The new Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) license for
sterile drug compounders is entirely voluntary, and the track-andtrace requirement will be phased
in over a decade, preempting a
California law that would have taken effect many years earlier.
Compounding gained unwelcome attention after the 2012
fungal meningitis outbreak that
was linked to the New England
Compounding Center (NECC) in
Framingham, Massachusetts. The
Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) has now identified 751 confirmed or probable
cases of fungal meningitis in
20 states, including 64 deaths in
9 states. Over the past year, beefedup state and FDA inspections have

uncovered substantial lapses at
many large compounding pharmacies throughout the country.
The states with the largest
death tolls from fungal menin
gitis did not routinely inspect
out-of-state compounders, relying
instead on pharmacies’ home-state
regulators. And it would not have
been practical for inspectors from
all 23 states receiving compounded
drugs from the NECC to physically travel to Framingham for
annual inspections. When states
noticed problems with NECC
products, coordination was lacking. In April 2011, Colorado filed
a cease-and-desist order against
the NECC, blocking sales in the
state.1 No fungal meningitis cases have been reported in Colorado, which speaks well of its regn engl j med

ulators. But the Colorado order
did not lead to quick action in
other states, despite the fact that
Colorado gave notice to both
Massachusetts and the FDA. When
compounders ship to dozens of
states, no single state is in a position to adequately regulate.
Congress had responded once
before, in 1997, with the passage
of Section 503A of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
Section 503A created a safe harbor for traditional local compounding pharmacies, exempting
them from further FDA regulation. Congress distinguished traditional compounding from manufacturing on the basis of several
features drawn from previous
guidance documents, including
whether the drug was advertised
or promoted. In Thompson v. Western States Medical Center (2002), the
Supreme Court struck down the
provision prohibiting the advertising of compounded drugs, deciding that it violated the First
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Proposed Massachusetts Reforms.*
Proposed Reform

Comments

Unannounced inspections

With limited enforcement resources, inspections should be risk-based. Scheduled
inspections fail to give a representative picture of conditions at the facility.

Mandatory reporting of serious
adverse events

Federal law and most states do not require reporting of serious adverse events with com
pounded drugs, although they do require such reporting for other prescription drugs.

Separate licenses for sterile and
nonsterile compounding based
on current USP standards

Sterile compounding entails different risks, justifying a more complete regulatory system.
Most states do not require full compliance with the relevant USP standards.

Transparent reporting of enforce
Transparency will ensure that all regulators and customers can evaluate quality problems,
ment actions on a public website
even if they originate in other states, and give compounders a market-based incentive
to improve.
Whistle-blower protections and
rewards for employees of
compounding pharmacies

The best source of information about quality problems is current employees. Under the
federal False Claims Act, whistle-blowers may qualify for substantial rewards if a
prosecution is successful.

Mandatory reporting of the volume
and scope of compounding
activities

Because registration as an outsourcing facility is voluntary, states should require dis
closure of the type and number of drugs produced and where they are shipped and
then share this information with the FDA, to permit the federal government to
prioritize enforcement resources for the highest-risk compounders.

Disclosures on labels and consent
forms

Physicians and patients deserve to know that a drug is compounded and whether it was
produced in an FDA-regulated facility. This information should be on the label and
clearly described in the patient consent form.

Full license requirements for outof-state compounders shipping
into Massachusetts

A compounder could avoid the new Massachusetts rules by relocating to a more lightly
regulated state. With an out-of-state license, all compounding pharmacies selling
drugs in a given state must meet the same quality standards.

* USP denotes U.S. Pharmacopeial Convention.

Amendment. After that decision,
the scope of the FDA’s remaining authority under Section 503A
was unclear.2
The Drug Quality and Security
Act reenacts Section 503A with
the advertising provisions removed. Traditional compounders
can now operate without fear of
federal enforcement. By inference, the FDA now has stronger
authority to proceed against any
compounder that exceeds the
limits of Section 503A. These
rules have been on the books
since 1997 but have never been
enforced, because of the Western
States litigation. Now, after more
than 16 years, the FDA can use
Section 503A.
The more disappointing provision of the new law is found in
Section 503B, which creates an
optional new license for sterile
compounders, to be known as
2

“outsourcing facilities.” This new
license applies tougher standards
than those applied to traditional
compounders but is less stringent
than the full rules applied to
drug manufacturers. In the Senate bill, the outsourcing-facility
license was mandatory, but the
final act followed the House bill,
making the license entirely voluntary. Over the past year, most
of the debate in Congress has
centered on how to draw the line
between traditional compounding and activities that require the
new license. The legislative compromise leaves that choice up to
the compounder.
Few compounders will eagerly
embrace the new license. Outsourcing facilities are subject to
higher expenses than traditional
compounders. They must comply
with current Good Manufacturing Practices and, for the first
n engl j med

time, report serious adverse events
that occur with compounded
drugs. Production and sales information must be provided to
the FDA, and the company must
pay a user fee for FDA inspections. If most large compounders
opt out, Section 503B will have
little effect.
If another tragedy similar to
the one involving the NECC is to
be avoided, additional action is
needed. Public health requires
new legislation in the states, robust enforcement by the FDA,
and greater vigilance for patient
safety by plans and providers.
First, states bear great responsibility for enforcement of compounding quality standards. Although a few states have modified
rules in the wake of the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak, most have
not yet acted.3 In light of the new
federal law, state legislative re-
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forms are now urgent. Many states
do not mandate compliance with
the sterile-compounding requirements found in U.S. Pharmacopeia Chapter 797. Most states do
not carefully regulate out-of-state
compounding pharmacies, nor do
they systematically share enforcement and inspection reports. The
FDA and Massachusetts enforcement actions against the NECC
began in 2004 but were not widely
reported to other states, and information about them was not
transparently available to health
care providers. If these steps had
been taken, the NECC might have
seen reduced sales in out-of-state
markets, prompting improvements
in quality control.
Massachusetts accepted primary regulatory responsibility for
the NECC tragedy and has spent
the past year on appropriate responses, with major reports and
proposed legislation from both
the governor and the legislature.4,5 Since the federal government has essentially ceded much
of the regulatory landscape to
the states, it is all the more important to ensure that state regulations meet minimum quality
standards while not triggering
drug shortages. Key features of
the proposed Massachusetts reforms are described in the table.
Each of these reforms plays an
important role in the quest to
improve the quality of compounded drugs. For example, the
out-of-state license is important
because otherwise a compounder
like the NECC could avoid the new
Massachusetts rules by relocating
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to a more lightly regulated state.
With an out-of-state license, all
compounding pharmacies selling
in Massachusetts must meet the
same quality standards.
Second, the FDA now has
clearer authority, especially over
outsourcing facilities, but will be
successful only if other stakeholders support the FDA. For example, the new law did not provide any additional budgetary
appropriations for inspecting compounders that do not register as
outsourcing facilities. Congress
needs to adequately fund this
mission. In addition, registration
as an outsourcing facility is voluntary. For compounders that
fail to register, the FDA relies on
states to regulate and share information.
Finally, rather than being passive in this process, providers
and health plans could act to improve the quality and availability
of compounded drugs. Purchasers can demand that their sterilecompounded drugs be sourced
exclusively from outsourcing facilities regulated by the FDA.
This decision could also be included in accreditation standards
and reimbursement contracts.
Such a market-based response
would force compounders to accede to their major customers’
demands and register with the
FDA. Alternatively, if providers
constantly seek out the cheapest
compounded drugs, then the unregulated compounders will have
an unfair competitive advantage
and we can expect few compounders to seek FDA approval.

n engl j med

The Drug Quality and Security
Act may have been a good first
step, but patients will not be protected unless states, the FDA, and
health care providers and plans
act quickly to fill in the gaps left
by Congress.
Disclosure forms provided by the author
are available with the full text of this article
at NEJM.org.
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2013, at NEJM.org.
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